In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/qaic: Clean up integer overflow checking in map_user_pages()
The encode_dma() function has some validation on in_trans->size but it
would be more clear to move those checks to find_and_map_user_pages().
The encode_dma() had two checks:
if (in_trans->addr + in_trans->size < in_trans->addr || !in_trans->size)
return -EINVAL;
The in_trans->addr variable is the starting address. The in_trans->size
variable is the total size of the transfer. The transfer can occur in
parts and the resources->xferred_dma_size tracks how many bytes we have
already transferred.
This patch introduces a new variable "remaining" which represents the
amount we want to transfer (in_trans->size) minus the amount we have
already transferred (resources->xferred_dma_size).
I have modified the check for if in_trans->size is zero to instead check
if in_trans->size is less than resources->xferred_dma_size. If we have
already transferred more bytes than in_trans->size then there are negative
bytes remaining which doesn't make sense. If there are zero bytes
remaining to be copied, just return success.
The check in encode_dma() checked that "addr + size" could not overflow
and barring a driver bug that should work, but it's easier to check if
we do this in parts. First check that "in_trans->addr +
resources->xferred_dma_size" is safe. Then check that "xfer_start_addr +
remaining" is safe.
My final concern was that we are dealing with u64 values but on 32bit
systems the kmalloc() function will truncate the sizes to 32 bits. So
I calculated "total = in_trans->size + offset_in_page(xfer_start_addr);"
and returned -EINVAL if it were >= SIZE_MAX. This will not affect 64bit
systems.
accel/qaic: Clean up integer overflow checking in map_user_pages()
The encode_dma() function has some validation on in_trans->size but it
would be more clear to move those checks to find_and_map_user_pages().
The encode_dma() had two checks:
if (in_trans->addr + in_trans->size < in_trans->addr || !in_trans->size)
return -EINVAL;
The in_trans->addr variable is the starting address. The in_trans->size
variable is the total size of the transfer. The transfer can occur in
parts and the resources->xferred_dma_size tracks how many bytes we have
already transferred.
This patch introduces a new variable "remaining" which represents the
amount we want to transfer (in_trans->size) minus the amount we have
already transferred (resources->xferred_dma_size).
I have modified the check for if in_trans->size is zero to instead check
if in_trans->size is less than resources->xferred_dma_size. If we have
already transferred more bytes than in_trans->size then there are negative
bytes remaining which doesn't make sense. If there are zero bytes
remaining to be copied, just return success.
The check in encode_dma() checked that "addr + size" could not overflow
and barring a driver bug that should work, but it's easier to check if
we do this in parts. First check that "in_trans->addr +
resources->xferred_dma_size" is safe. Then check that "xfer_start_addr +
remaining" is safe.
My final concern was that we are dealing with u64 values but on 32bit
systems the kmalloc() function will truncate the sizes to 32 bits. So
I calculated "total = in_trans->size + offset_in_page(xfer_start_addr);"
and returned -EINVAL if it were >= SIZE_MAX. This will not affect 64bit
systems.
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | |||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux | unaffected |
|
|||||||||||||||
| Linux | Linux | affected |
|
No data.
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Advisories
No advisories yet.
Fixes
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
References
History
Wed, 10 Dec 2025 12:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
threat_severity
|
cvssV3_1
|
Tue, 09 Dec 2025 00:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/qaic: Clean up integer overflow checking in map_user_pages() The encode_dma() function has some validation on in_trans->size but it would be more clear to move those checks to find_and_map_user_pages(). The encode_dma() had two checks: if (in_trans->addr + in_trans->size < in_trans->addr || !in_trans->size) return -EINVAL; The in_trans->addr variable is the starting address. The in_trans->size variable is the total size of the transfer. The transfer can occur in parts and the resources->xferred_dma_size tracks how many bytes we have already transferred. This patch introduces a new variable "remaining" which represents the amount we want to transfer (in_trans->size) minus the amount we have already transferred (resources->xferred_dma_size). I have modified the check for if in_trans->size is zero to instead check if in_trans->size is less than resources->xferred_dma_size. If we have already transferred more bytes than in_trans->size then there are negative bytes remaining which doesn't make sense. If there are zero bytes remaining to be copied, just return success. The check in encode_dma() checked that "addr + size" could not overflow and barring a driver bug that should work, but it's easier to check if we do this in parts. First check that "in_trans->addr + resources->xferred_dma_size" is safe. Then check that "xfer_start_addr + remaining" is safe. My final concern was that we are dealing with u64 values but on 32bit systems the kmalloc() function will truncate the sizes to 32 bits. So I calculated "total = in_trans->size + offset_in_page(xfer_start_addr);" and returned -EINVAL if it were >= SIZE_MAX. This will not affect 64bit systems. | |
| Title | accel/qaic: Clean up integer overflow checking in map_user_pages() | |
| First Time appeared |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| References |
|
Projects
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MITRE
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Linux
Published:
Updated: 2025-12-09T00:00:34.074Z
Reserved: 2025-12-08T23:58:35.272Z
Link: CVE-2023-53778
Vulnrichment
No data.
NVD
Status : Awaiting Analysis
Published: 2025-12-09T01:16:48.887
Modified: 2025-12-09T18:37:13.640
Link: CVE-2023-53778
Redhat
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.
Weaknesses
No weakness.